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Inequality and Poverty Reduction and the Limits of Social 
Protection Systems: The Case of Argentina during the Stage of 





Latin America experienced a rapid decrease of poverty and inequality during the first years of the 
new millennium that eventually decelerated in recent years. In Argentina, a key aspect of poverty 
and inequality reduction seemed to be simultaneous changes in labour markets and in social 
protection systems, particularly in social assistance. However, these elements have rarely been 
considered together at household level in Argentina and in Latin America, even though labour 
markets and social policies are the core of the welfare regime. Thus, the main aim of the article 
is to examine how these spheres were articulated among different groups of households and to 
assess their welfare outcomes. The article draws upon a quantitative methodology using official 
data and micro-data of the Permanent Household Survey from Argentina for 2003-2014. The 
main hypothesis is that the expansion of the social protection system coexisted with a persistent 
labour informality, which maintained the heterogeneity of the welfare regime mitigating the 
power of social protection to reduce poverty and inequality. Moreover, our study shows the limits 
in developing countries for sustainable reduction of poverty and for social inclusion in absence 
of deep changes in labour markets, even in a relatively favourable macroeconomic context for 
more equitable wealth distribution. 
Keywords 
Social Policy; Inequality; Poverty; Welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a wide consensus about the detrimental 
effects that neoliberal structural adjustment had 
in developing countries throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s (Barrientos and Hulme, 2009; Ghosh, 
2011; Heintz and Lund, 2012). In Latin America, 
economic reforms led to growing inequality 
(Gasparini et al., 2016; Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 
2010; Lustig et al., 2012; Wade, 2004), and public 
                                                 
 
1 According to ECLAC data, Gini coefficient for the entire 
region (as a weighted average) was 0.563 in 1990 and 
reduced to 0.506 in 2015. Poverty rate was 46.2 per cent 
policies implemented to address this situation 
seemed insufficient to reduce poverty and 
unemployment (ECLAC, 2014). However, 
during the last decade the Latin American region 
at large experienced a phase of “declining 
inequality” (Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 2010) and 
poverty (ECLAC, 2012) even when these trends 
eventually decelerated (Gasparini et al, 2016)1. 
in 1990 and 28 per cent in the region in 2015. Data is 
available in http://estadisticas.cepal.org.   
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Argentina is an example worth to examining in 
relation to the issues posed above as the country 
has seen inequality and poverty reduction 
following the economic crisis of 2001 
(Groisman, 2013; Cruces and Gasparini, 2013). 
Indeed, it appears that changes that occurred in 
labour markets and in the social protection 
system (especially in its non-contributory 
elements)2 have played a central role in 
supporting the reduction of inequality and 
poverty. Hence, it comes as a surprise that these 
elements –labour market and social protection– 
have rarely been considered together at 
household level, especially when they are at the 
core of the so-called “welfare regime” (Esping-
Andersen, 1990, 1999; Martinez-Franzoni, 2008; 
Wood and Gough, 2006). The specialised 
literature has tended to focus on labour markets 
at the individual level or in social policies from 
an aggregated perspective (Beccaria and 
Maurizio, 2012; Cecchini et al., 2015; Maurizio, 
2015; Rofman and Oliveri, 2012; Salvia, Vera 
and Poy, 2015; Trujillo and Villafane, 2012). 
Relatively few studies have considered the 
problem from the perspective of households 
(Groisman, 2011), and these studies have not 
taken into account how changes in the labour 
markets participated with other sources of 
welfare in terms of families’ incomes.  
This article aims to fill this knowledge gap. In 
particular, it aims to critically examine how 
labour markets and social protection system 
expressed in economic household welfare 
outcomes. A critical concern of the article is to 
understand if and how such articulations were 
different for diverse groups of households, 
shedding light on the issue of social inequalities. 
In so doing, the article contributes to two 
different broader debates. Firstly, it brings 
elements to the debate that allow us to 
reconsider the “decoupling” between 
employment structures and social policies from 
a broader perspective. As Heintz and Razavi 
(2012) stressed, this decoupling is a key aspect of 
the current research agenda, partly due to 
                                                 
 
2 Following Barrientos (2016: 12-13), in this paper we 
consider that social protection includes, in institutional 
terms, social insurance and social assistance. Social insurance 
includes the contributory programmes, whereas social 
assistance refers to not contributory budget-financed 
changes in labour markets which challenge 
traditional assumptions concerning social 
policies. By binding labour market structure and 
social protection together in terms of household 
welfare, the article contributes to the effort to 
unravel the nature of the relationships between 
these variables. Secondly, the article examines 
the nature and limits of social protection systems 
in increasing economic welfare and reducing 
poverty in developing countries during a phase 
of considerable economic growth as the one 
examined in this article (Ghosh, 2011; Heintz 
and Lund, 2012; Saad-Filho, 2015).  
The theoretical and methodological framework 
that informs this study recognises that welfare is 
provided by the spheres of the market, the state 
and families, as institutions that deal with social 
risks, and in their interaction, define a welfare 
regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999; Wood 
and Gough, 2006). But as Wood and Gough 
(2006) argue, these three spheres do not play the 
same role nor have de same scope among 
different socioeconomic positions. In this vein, 
the main hypothesis of the article is that the 
expansion of the social protection system 
coexisted with a persistent labour informality, 
which maintained –although in a lower level than 
at the beginning of the period 2003-2014– the 
heterogeneity of the welfare regime and thus of 
welfare outcomes.  
The article draws upon a quantitative 
methodology which is explained in the second 
section. The model adopted initially uses official 
data from Argentina to examine how public 
social expenditure evolved during the period 
2003-2014. It then uses micro-data from the 
Permanent Household Survey (EPH) of 
Argentina for the period 2003-2014 to analyse 
the effects of labour markets and of changes to 
the social protection system. The EPH survey is 
carried out quarterly by the National Institute of 
Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) in the biggest 
cities of the country and represents almost 62 
per cent of total population.  
programmes which are focused in reducing poverty and 
vulnerability. For its part, social policy is a broader concept, 
which includes not only social protection but the provision 
of public goods and services (Heintz and Lund, 2012: 3-
4). 
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The article is divided into five sections. In the 
first section, a literature review is presented. 
Specifically, we introduce the notion of welfare 
regime as a broad theoretical framework to study 
how welfare is “packaged” by households. The 
second section describes the methodological 
approach adopted and the data used. The third 
section describes political and economic changes 
occurred in Argentina during the 2003-2014 
period and provides a broad picture of 
transformations in labour markets and social 
protection. The fourth section examines changes 
in three aspects concerning household welfare. 
Firstly, households’ access to formal 
employment is considered. Secondly, public 
social expenditure evolution and its impact 
households’ budgets and poverty are analysed. 
Thirdly, the article presents a model of 
household per capita income variation 
decomposition. This model assesses how labour 
markets’ income sources, social benefits and 
other non-labour incomes explain welfare 
outcomes. The fifth section presents some 
concluding remarks and main contributions to 
knowledge. 
 
2. Labour markets, social protection and 
the welfare regime 
Households are the units in which social 
reproduction and needs satisfaction of 
population take place (Heintz and Lund, 2012). 
Labour market participation, the use of 
resources from different spheres (informal 
networks as well as formal cash allowances) and 
consumption practices are all organised within 
households3. Putting households at the centre of 
the analysis makes several processes simpler to 
understand. On the one hand, it allows us to link 
the individual workforce and welfare of all 
households’ members –whether they participate 
in labour market or no. On the other hand, it 
allows us to reassess how social policies affect 
life conditions, since social policies are 
commonly aimed at households (Martinez-
Franzoni, 2008). Therefore, considering 
                                                 
 
3 It has to be stressed that the perspective followed here 
acknowledges that households are not homogeneous 
units. On the contrary, within households take place 
households is useful to bind together labour 
markets and social protection. 
The existence of different arrangements 
between households, markets and the state with 
respect to needs satisfaction underlies the 
concept of the welfare regime. This notion was 
introduced by Esping-Andersen to consider “the 
combined, interdependent way in which welfare 
is produced and allocated between state, market, 
and family” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 34-35).  
A central idea for this theoretical approach is 
that these institutions deal with social risks, 
which might be considered as opposite of needs 
satisfaction. According to Esping-Andersen, a 
welfare regime distributes social risks 
management among different spheres. At the 
macro-social level, risk management is 
determined by the operation of each of these 
three spheres and their reciprocal relationships. 
At the micro-social level, individual welfare 
depends on “how they manage to ‘package’ 
inputs from the three [spheres]... The household 
is the ultimate destination of welfare 
consumption and allocation. It is the unit ‘at 
risk’” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 36).  
An advantage of the notion of the welfare 
regime is that rebuilds the process of workforce 
reproduction as a whole. Therefore, the concept 
recovers both Marx and Polanyi’s idea that in 
capitalist societies the “great transformation” is 
that of the commodification of workforce and, 
then, the process of needs satisfaction relies 
mainly on a cash nexus (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). Thus, inadequate or absence of labour 
incomes is the main social risk that households 
face in a market-based society. In this vein, 
Esping-Andersen’s concept of “de-
commodification” is central. Since life depends 
on a cash nexus, a welfare regime is defined in 
terms of its degree of “de-commodification”, 
that is, the degree in which the workforce can 
avoid the market in order to reproduce their lives 
and those of their families (Esping-Andersen, 
1990: 37). In the so-called “liberal” welfare 
regimes, the state gives modest social transfers, 
differences among genders and generations with several 
impacts in terms of social inequalities. 
INCASI Working Paper Series, 2018, No. 5 
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so de-commodification is low. On the opposite 
side, the “social-democratic” regime is based on 
generous cash transfers that ensure households 
higher levels of de-commodification and higher 
degrees of welfare.  
The welfare regime approach in Esping-
Andersen’s work was mainly developed for 
advanced capitalist societies. As Wood and 
Gough (2006) point out, even when Esping-
Andersen’s defines different types of regimes, 
some aspects are shared by all of them, 
including: 1) the dominant mode of production 
is capitalist; 2) inequalities derive mainly from 
exploitation of wage labour; 3) the dominant 
means of securing livelihoods is via employment 
in formal labour markets (Wood and Gough, 
2006: 1699). Likewise, this approach assumes a 
homogeneous labour market in which formal 
employment is extended to the full workforce, 
households are mainly nuclear and wage earners 
and employers contribute to social protection 
system (Heintz and Lund, 2012).  
As Martinez-Franzoni (2008) stressed, the 
labour market is the institutional sphere from 
which households can obtain welfare inputs and 
becomes thus critical in shaping the welfare 
regime. However, in developing countries and 
particularly in Latin America, structural 
heterogeneity is a feature of their economies and 
labour markets (ECLAC, 2014), which puts 
them outside from the assumptions of Esping-
Andersen’s approach for Western economies. 
Structural heterogeneity mainly results from the 
way in which Latin America inserts itself in 
global markets, namely as a specialised provider 
of commodities. It describes the existence of 
uneven development between economic sectors 
in terms of productivity, insufficient labour 
demand in high productivity sectors and thus 
surplus workforce in low productivity activities 
(Infante, 2011). Since one of the most important 
determinants of labour markets characteristics is 
the productive structure (Fine, 2003), structural 
                                                 
 
4 Some global trends of labour markets, like growing 
precariousness (Standing, 2011) or, generally speaking, 
informal employment, are reinforced by structural 
heterogeneity in developing countries. This seems to be 
particularly the case under globalisation. Economic 
openness implicated the readjustment of several activities 
heterogeneity results in a broad informal 
economy and an extensive part of workforce 
working in the so-called informal sector (Infante, 
2011). In this context, informal economy 
includes normally low-productivity activities and 
subsistence entrepreneurship (Portes and Haller, 
2004), as widespread expressions of self-
employment and poverty4. 
Wood and Gough (2006) and Gough (2013) 
stress how the heterogeneity of labour markets 
and social structures impact on the welfare 
regime in developing countries:  
Different categories of a country’s population 
can experience different primary regimes: some 
might be successfully incorporated into state 
protection; others reliant upon community and 
family arrangements; and others more excluded 
from formal or informal mainstream 
arrangements… (Wood and Gough, 2006: 
1701). 
Indeed, different socio-economic groups will 
face different “risk structures”, especially those 
related to poverty and deprivation. Persistent 
informality in labour markets, as the “systemic 
roots” of poverty (Saad-Filho, 2015: 1245) play 
a central role in defining the kinds of risk 
households may face. Households have to 
package inputs from informal or formal work, 
subsistence activities, as well as formal 
allowances (especially those from the state), and 
the ways in which these inputs are packaged are 
likely to differ among different groups. 
Since traditional social protection was highly 
determined by labour market participation and 
based on contributory systems, welfare regimes 
in Latin America were “stratified” and 
“segmented” (Barba-Solano, 2007). The 
structural adjustment phase implied the growth 
of targeted social policies in Latin America 
(specifically, Conditional Cash Transfers – 
CCT). According to Barrientos and Hulme 
(2009: 442-443), social assistance was specifically 
focused in attending poverty and deprivation in 
to more competitive markets, which in turn resulted in 
growing precariousness as a way to put labour cost down 
(Heintz and Razavi, 2012). Thus, in developing countries, 
informal sector and informal employment are structural 
features of labour markets.  
Santiago Poy & Leandro Sepulveda 
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a context of globalisation and reforms that led to 
growing inequality and social conflict. During 
the 2000s, social assistance expanded, reaching 
most part of poor households in developing 
countries (Barrientos and Hulme, 2009). To an 
important degree, this expansion was possible 
due to export-based economic growth and the 
will of the government in office (Barrientos, 
2016).  
These transformations led to a debate around 
the idea of “universalisation” of social 
protection. According to some authors, this idea 
moves beyond “safety nets”, as they were called 
in “Washington Consensus” terms, and implies 
social assistance to promote human 
development and capabilities (Barrientos, 2016). 
Other authors refer to the idea of 
universalisation to describe “degrees” of 
coverage achieved by social protection systems, 
and the construction of a social protection floor 
(Cecchini et al., 2015). Finally, from a critical 
perspective, some authors stress that social 
assistance expansion in developing countries did 
not look to solve poverty in a sustainable way 
(which would demand addressing its structural 
causes) but subsidize low-productivity, informal 
employment in countries that already lack full 
formal employment (Saad-Filho, 2015). 
Several changes occurred in Argentina in the last 
decade including a sustained economic growth 
and expansion of the social protection system. 
Even when changes in economic growth, labour 
markets and social protection were evident and 
seemed to have played an important role in 
household welfare, the specialised literature 




To fill this gap, the concept of the welfare regime 
is useful to bind labour markets, social 
protection and household welfare together. 
Wood and Gough (2006) and Gough (2013) 
consider that a welfare regime comprises four 
components: the institutional framework, the 
“welfare mix”, the pattern of stratification and 
mobilization, and, finally, the outcomes of the 
welfare regime. The welfare mix includes the role 
of labour markets and other private sector 
markets (providing goods and services), the state 
and the social protection system, community and 
informal allowances, as well as households’ 
behaviours, for example, in order to improve 
their welfare. The welfare outcomes are the 
dependent variable of analysis, because they 
include the level of human development, need 
satisfaction, poverty and subjective well-being 
(Wood and Gough, 2006: 1701).  
In this article, we focus on the aspects of the 
welfare mix that have effects in terms of 
household incomes. We seek to answer the 
following questions: how did the interrelation 
between labour markets, social protection 
system and households’ behaviours evolve 
during 2003-2014? In particular: how did the 
labour market structure interact with the social 
protection system to generate changes to 
welfare? What differences can be recorded in 
such interaction of spheres among different 
groups and which is the specific effect of the 
social protection and the labour markets upon 
economic welfare and poverty? In order to 
answer these questions, our methodological 
framework considers four main aspects that 
describe the welfare mix: (1) households’ access 
to opportunities of formal employment; (2) 
evolution of social policies expenditure (SPE); 
the (3) impact of the social protection system’s 
transfers on households’ budgets and poverty; 
and (4) the effects of incomes from labour and 
social policies upon household per capita 
income (HPCI), considering two micro-social 
households’ behaviours: households’ size and 
structure and the number of income earners of 
different sources (Cortes, 1995).  
To describe access to formal employment and 
social inequalities among different groups we use 
the International Labour Office’s (ILO) 
framework (Hussmans, 2004). The informal 
economy contains both employment in the 
informal sector (a sector defined by levels of 
productivity of the firms) and the informal 
employment inside and outside the informal 
sector (a kind of labour relationships that do not 
include social protection). This framework 
allows us to consider structural heterogeneity in 
the labour market (especially regarding to the 
informal sector) and also precariousness and 
informal jobs outside this sector. Our 
methodology considers the following categories: 
INCASI Working Paper Series, 2018, No. 5 
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formal employers or self-employed or own-
accounts (employers in firms with more than 5 
employees, or qualified own-accounts or with 
their own capital), formal employees (employees 
with a contract and social protection 
contribution), informal employers or own-
accounts (employers in firms with less than 5 
employees, not qualified own-account), informal 
employees (employees without social 
protection), household employees (employees 
working on private households), unemployed, 
inactive/ retired people and other inactive 
people who are not retired. In order to identify 
households’ participation in the labour market, 
we focus on the economic position of 
Household Main Earner (HME).  
In this article, we are interested in considering 
how different incomes sources, specifically those 
coming from labour markets and social 
protection system, contributed to change 
household income (as a relevant measurement of 
welfare). Most research focused on the welfare 
regime tends to assess economic welfare from an 
aggregated perspective, considering different 
indicators of welfare outcomes (for example, 
GDP per capita, poverty rate, etc.). However, 
since households are the “units at risk”, a 
complementary approach may be adopted. 
Economic welfare –measured by the household 
per capita income (HPCI)– can be instead seen 
as a result both of different incomes sources 
(namely, labour markets’ incomes and social 
policies’ benefits) and some micro-social 
households’ behaviours, such as the number of 
incomes’ recipients per income source and size 
of household. In order to consider all these 
factors, we decompose changes in HPCI. This 
decomposition model is an extension of that of 
Cortes (1995, 2000), who applied this method to 
Mexico’s income distribution. Commonly, 
economists decompose income inequality –
using an index, such as Gini or Theil coefficients 
(Bourguignon and Ferreira, 2004)– or poverty 
rate –as in the well-known Datt and Ravallion 
decomposition (1992)–. From a complementary 
perspective, we may include here the 
                                                 
 
5 Beyond Cortes (1995) there are some others previous 
research using this kind of approach. In Argentina, Donza 
decomposition of income’s growth between two 
periods of time5.  
The household per capita income (HPCI) of a 
group of households g can be written as follows:  
 
HPCIg = IRECg  NRECHg NHMEMg
-1   (1), 
This means that HPCI is the result of the income 
per recipient (IRECg), the number of recipients 
or incomes earners per household (NRECg) and 
the inverse of the number of members of 
households (NHMEMg). As Cortes (1995) has 
shown, when these factors change between t0 
and t1 at rates r, p and e, HPCI change can be 
written as follows:  
ΔHPCIg t1, t0 = HPCIg t0 (r + p + e + rp + re +  
                                     pe + rpe)    (2), 
Where r, p and e are actual variation rates of 
income per recipient, the number of recipients 
per household and the inverse of number of 
members of households, respectively; and the 
other terms are interaction between them. 
Following the previous logic, different k 
incomes sources can be added in order to 
describe changes in household per capita 
income. Re-writing equation (1): 
HPCIg = IRECg,k1  NRECg,k1 NHMEMg
-1 + (…)                
              + IRECg,kn  NRECg,kn NHMEMg
-1        (3) 
Since we are interested in changes of HPCI 
between t0 and t1, we may re-write equation (2) 
as follows: 
ΔHPCIg t1, t0 = HPCIg k1,t0 (rk1 + pk1 + e + rk1pk1 +   
                      rk1e + pk1e + rk1pk1e) + (…) +  
                      HPCIg kn,t0 (rkn + pkn + e + rknpkn +  
                      rkne + pkne + rknpkne)       (4) 
Applying equation (4) to micro-data, the interest 
is to consider the weight of different factors on 
changes in the HPCI between two different 
points of time. 
Data on public social expenditure was accessed 
from official information of the Ministerio de 
Economia de la Nacion –Economic Department of 
Argentina–. To analyse households’ access to 
formal employment as well as effects of social 
(2015) applied this method. In the United Kingdom a 
similar perspective was used by Brewer and Wren-Lewis 
(2011). 
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protection system on budgets, poverty and 
incomes, data come from the Encuesta 
Permanente de Hogares (EPH) –Permanent 
Household Survey–, which is carried out 
quarterly by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y 
Censos (INDEC) –National Statistics Office of 
Argentina–. This survey is based on an urban 
sample of the most important cities of the 
country, capturing data for around 17 thousand 
households per quarter6. 
 
4. Political and economic context of labour 
markets and social protection changes 
Literature tends to include Argentina among the 
group of most “developed” welfare regimes in 
Latin America, since it had an early and relatively 
well-developed contributory-based social 
protection system and an extended formal 
labour market (Isuani, 2008). Despite being a 
stratified schema –as all “bismarckian” systems– 
social protection expanded during the last 
century. The schema, however, changed during 
the last decades, and especially during the 1990’s 
phase of structural adjustment. During this 
period, unemployment increased from 5.3 per 
cent in 1991 to 21 per cent in 2001. Informal 
employment in turn grew from 27.7 per cent to 
30.8 per cent (Beccaria and Maurizio, 2012: 207). 
In that context, changes in social structure led to 
a gap between the institutional architecture of 
social protection and the structure of risks faced 
by households. 
During the last decade, Argentina experienced 
high levels of economic growth –as many other 
countries of Latin America7 did–. Among the 
most important factors that led to high levels of 
growth, was the significant 2002 currency 
devaluation, which lead to a new phase of 
“import substitution”. During 2003 and 2007, 
economic growth was based on industrial 
installed capacity, exports and a competitive and 
stable exchange rate (Damill, Frenkel and 
Maurizio, 2011). Nevertheless, between 2008 
and 2014 economic growth weakened in relation 
to the previous period and so did the import 
                                                 
 
6 According to the last National Census, almost 90 per 
cent of Argentine population live in urban districts, so the 
level of urbanisation is high compared to other countries 
of Latin America. 
substitution strategy (Gaggero, Schorr and 
Wainer, 2014). The economic performance had 
impacts on labour markets. On the one hand, 
unemployment, which had risen during 
structural adjustment phase, fell from 24.8 in 
2002 to 8 per cent in 2010; as did informal 
employment, which dropped from 29.4 to 25.7 
per cent (Beccaria and Maurizio, 2012). On the 
other hand, literature has noted that the 
proportion of workforce employed in the 
informal sector and thus structural heterogeneity 
of labour market remained high in a long-term 
perspective (Salvia, Vera and Poy, 2015). 
The social protection system also changed 
during the phase of structural adjustment. The 
contributory pension system’s coverage was 
reduced –as the informal employment grew– 
and it was privatised (Rofman and Oliveri, 2012). 
In accordance with the principles of neoliberal 
social policy (Saad-Filho, 2015), several anti-
poverty programmes were expanded, and most 
were based on a “workfare” paradigm. During 
the 2001-2002 financial crisis, the first massive 
Conditional Cash Transfer was launched: the 
Plan Jefes de Hogar Desocupados (PJJHD) –
Unemployed Household Head Programme–, 
aimed at unemployed heads of household 
(Cruces et al, 2008).  
During the period 2003-2014 the social 
protection system increased its coverage in three 
different aspects. (i) The government 
implemented an extension of the contributory-
based pensions system (the so-called moratoria –
Moratorium–, that started in 2005) for the 
elderly who had not worked the requisite 
number of years to retire but were old enough 
for retirement (Danani and Beccaria, 2013). 
Also, the government expanded non-
contributory pensions, especially pensions for 
disability and those for mothers with 7 or more 
children (Rofman, 2013). (ii) Anti-poverty 
programmes also expanded during the decade, 
following the trend started in the 1990s. Several 
workfare programmes were developed during 
2003-2014, simultaneously to PJJHD, 
7 Between 2003 and 2014, according to ECLAC data, Latin 
America’s GDP had an average annual variation rate of 3.3 
per cent. In many years, variation was more than 6 per cent 
(like 2004 and 2010).  
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specifically aimed at unskilled workforce (Ingreso 
Social con Trabajo –Social Income with 
Employment–, Seguro de Capacitacion y Empleo –
Training and Employment Insurance–). But 
other “welfare” programmes were created. 
Specifically, the Asignacion Universal por Hijo 
(AUH) –Universal Child Allowance–, a welfare 
CCT based on human capital development 
(Cecchini et al., 2015) was introduced to address 
poverty as in many countries of Latin America 
(Saad-Filho, 2015). It is a conditional cash 
transfer for children whose parents are informal 
employees or unemployed and do not have other 
social protection8. (iii) Finally, the contributory-
based familiar allowances system called 
Asignaciones Familiares –Contributory Family 
Allowance– grew slightly9.  
The next section examines the effects of changes 
in labour markets and social protection upon 
household welfare. The main objective of the 
section is to describe how these spheres 
articulated and produced outcomes among 
different groups of households. 
5. Changes in the ‘welfare mix’: 
employment, social protection and 
household welfare 
 
5.1 Access to Formal Employment 
 
Several changes in households’ opportunities to 
access formal employment became apparent 
during the period 2003-2014 (see Table 1). 
Households whose Main Earner (HME) was 
formally employed increased from 43.2 to 55.5 
per cent of the total. The major part of these 
changes took place between 2003 and 2007, 
whereas during the period 2007-2014 
households had more difficulties accessing 
formal employment. The period 2003 and 2007 
was characterized by a strong economic growth, 
which explains labour market recovery and 
formal employment growth (Groisman, 2013). 
The process was also followed by an active 




Table 1. Labour Market Position of Household Main Earner 
In percentage of households with Economically-Active Household Main Earner. Argentina, 2003-2014 
  
2003 2005 2007 2010 2012 2014 
Diff.  
2003-2014 
Formal Employers / Own-Account 7.4 7.9 7.8 7.9 7.6 7.6 0.27 
Formal Employees 43.2 47.0 52.1 56.0 55.7 55.5 12.28*** 
Informal Employers / Own-Account 17.9 17.4 16.3 15.2 16.8 15.0 -2.86*** 
Informal Employees 17.2 17.6 16.1 13.9 13.9 14.6 -2.64*** 
Household Employees 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.4 4.1 4.7 -0.60 
Unemployed 9.1 5.1 2.8 2.7 1.9 2.6 -6.45*** 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   
Notes: (1) T-test for difference of proportions / (2) p-value<0.1* / p-value<0.05** / p-value<0.01***   
Source: Authors' own calculations based on Permanent Household Survey (EPH-INDEC).     
 
 
Nevertheless, Table 1 also shows that by 2014, 
almost four of every ten households had a a head 
of household that was either an informal 
employee or employer, a self-employed 
                                                 
 
8 Other programmes were also implemented, such as the 
Asignacion Universal por Embarazo –Universal Allowance for 
Pregnant Women–, an allowance for pregnant women 
without other social protection, or the Programa de Respaldo 
a Estudiantes de Argentina –Argentine Students Support 
Programme–, a programme for students whose parents 
were in the informal economy. 
individual, a household employee, or 
unemployed. This trend reveals that economic 
growth was not enough to produce deep changes 
in the productive structure and thus in labour 
9 The Contributory Family Allowance began in 1934 and 
expanded in 1957. Since then, it is a part of the social 
protection system aimed to formal employees. In 1996, 
access was limited to employees earning less than a 
maximum (Bertranou and Maurizio, 2012). During 2003-
2014, that maximum did not evolve following inflation 
rate, thus producing that expansion of formal employment 
was far from the expansion of this benefit.  
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markets (Beccaria and Maurizio, 2012; Salvia, 
Vera and Poy, 2015). It also reveals that 
economic growth was not enough condition to 
solve the importance of workforce in low 
productivity activities (Saad-Filho, 2015).    
A complementary point of view in order to 
describe the inequality pattern that households 
faced during the period is considering access to 
formal employment by other members that are 
not the HME. Indeed, when households have 
more than one economically active person, they 
might have a formal employee even when the 
HME has an informal job. It is important to 
consider how the opportunities of formal job 
changed during this decade among secondary 
household earners. Indeed, according to some 
theories, informality is “preferred” by those 
employees that live in households that have a 
formal employee (Maloney, 2008).  
Table 2 shows that during the whole period, 
households with formal employment tended to 
concentrate formal employments. That is, 
compared to a household with an informally 
employed HME, the presence of a formally 
employed HME increased the likelihood of a 
formally employed secondary household earner. 
In accordance, in households in which the HME 
had an informal employment, there were lower 
chances for the secondary earners to have formal 
employments. Moreover, the level of access to 
formal employment in this period tended to 
remain the same for a secondary earner in a 
household with an informally employed HME. 
 
 
Table 2. Formal Employment Opportunities among Secondary Household Earners by 
Labour Market Position of HME.  Odds Ratios. Argentina, 2003-2014. 
  2003 2005 2007 2010 2012 2014 
Formal Employers / Own-Account 1.284* 1.121 1.156 1.367** 1.051 1.041 
  (0.136) (0.128) (0.116) (0.120) (0.127) (0.122) 
Formal Employees ©             
Informal Employers / Own-Account 0.332*** 0.366*** 0.375*** 0.392*** 0.351*** 0.337*** 
  (0.095) (0.090) (0.076) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) 
Informal Employees 0.263*** 0.251*** 0.254*** 0.312*** 0.302*** 0.298*** 
  (0.103) (0.104) (0.086) (0.090) (0.090) (0.086) 
Household Employees 0.202*** 0.148*** 0.132*** 0.197*** 0.245*** 0.228*** 
  (0.245) (0.272) (0.227) (0.198) (0.184) (0.173) 
Unemployed 0.208*** 0.183*** 0.220*** 0.388*** 0.240*** 0.240*** 
  (0.182) (0.255) (0.247) (0.286) (0.339) (0.296) 
Notes: (1) Binomial Logistic regression. Dependent Variable: Access to Formal Employment Among Secondary Household 
Earners. Variables included: Labour Market Position of HME, Household size, Number of children<15 years, Educational 
Level of Adults >18 years, Household Head Sex, Household Head Age. 
(2) p-value<0.1* / p-value<0.05** / p-value<0.01*** / (3) Standard Errors in Parenthesis / (4) Formal Employees is 
Comparison Category. 
Source: Authors' own calculations based on Permanent Household Survey (EPH-INDEC).     
 
 
Nevertheless, Table 1 also shows that by 2014, 
almost four of every ten households had a a head 
of household that was either an informal 
employee or employer, a self-employed 
individual, a household employee, or 
unemployed. This trend reveals that economic 
growth was not enough to produce deep changes 
in the productive structure and thus in labour 
markets (Beccaria and Maurizio, 2012; Salvia, 
Vera and Poy, 2015). It also reveals that 
economic growth was not enough condition to 
solve the importance of workforce in low 
productivity activities (Saad-Filho, 2015).    
A complementary point of view in order to 
describe the inequality pattern that households 
faced during the period is considering access to 
formal employment by other members that are 
not the HME. Indeed, when households have 
more than one economically active person, they 
might have a formal employee even when the 
HME has an informal job. It is important to 
consider how the opportunities of formal job 
changed during this decade among secondary 
household earners. Indeed, according to some 
theories, informality is “preferred” by those 
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employees that live in households that have a 
formal employee (Maloney, 2008).  
Table 2 shows that during the whole period, 
households with formal employment tended to 
concentrate formal employments. That is, 
compared to a household with an informally 
employed HME, the presence of a formally 
employed HME increased the likelihood of a 
formally employed secondary household earner. 
In accordance, in households in which the HME 
had an informal employment, there were lower 
chances for the secondary earners to have formal 
employments. Moreover, the level of access to 
formal employment in this period tended to 
remain the same for a secondary earner in a 
household with an informally employed HME.  
These results show two sets of trends related to 
the welfare mix. In the first set of trends, there 
was an important recovery of formal 
employment but a persistent level of 
participation in the informal economy. In the 
second set of trends, households in which the 
HME was informal had difficulties accessing 
formal employment and given an informal HME 
it became no more likely over this period for the 
secondary earners to be formally employed. This 
finding seems to challenge the theories that 
emphasize a “voluntary” element of informality 
(Maloney, 2008, Perry et al., 2007) and focus on 
persistent inequalities in labour markets due to 
structural heterogeneity. 
 
5.2 Social Policies Expenditure (SPE) and 
Effects on Households’ Budgets and 
Poverty  
Social Policies Expenditure (SPE)10 in Argentina 
increased from 19.2 to 27.6 per cent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) between 2003 and 
2013 (last data available). This is the highest 
value since there are records in the country 
(series start in 1980). Universal expenditure –
namely health, education and housing 
expenditures, among others– increased from 8.6 
                                                 
 
10 Data in this section comes from Economical Politics 
and Development Planning Secretary of the Economic 
Department of Argentina. These data are available in: 
http://www.economia.gob.ar/secretarias/politica-
to 15.3 per cent (almost doubled) in the same 
period. Even when this part of SPE does not 
have a direct impact on household incomes, it is 
an important part of the changes observed in the 
welfare mix.  
Nevertheless, a part of SPE is directly aimed at 
household incomes. Expenditure for the 
pension system grew from 6.6 to 10.1 per cent 
of GDP between 2003 and 2013 and represented 
more than a third of SPE. According to survey 
data from the EPH, whereas in 2004 70.5 per 
cent of population older than 65 years had access 
to a pension, that proportion climbed to 91.9 per 
cent in 2013. This was mainly the result of the 
extension of the contributory-based pensions 
system, but also of the growth of non-
contributory based pensions. Expenditure in 
social assistance and Conditional Cash Transfers 
(CCTs) remained stable as a part of GDP. It 
represented 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2003 and 2.2 
per cent in 2014. In 2003, the majority of social 
assistance was dedicated to PJJHD, a “workfare” 
CCT. By 2014, “welfare” CCTs expanded and 
explained most part of social assistance 
expenditure.  
Even when data provide an aggregated 
perspective, as Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) 
stressed, households are the units at risk, and 
have to deal with different inputs in order to 
guarantee welfare for their members. In this 
vein, from now on we focus on the effects of 
changes in SPE at household level. In so doing 
we focus upon that part of SPE that comprises 
economic inputs for households. Social 
protection benefits considered here include: (1) 
Employment Programmes (such as PJJHD), 
Asignaciones Familiares –Contributory Family 
Allowance– and, due to its small statistical 
incidence, contributory based unemployment 
insurance; (2) pensions; (3) social assistance cash 
transfers such as the Asignacion Universal por Hijo 
–Universal Child Allowance–, among others 
Conditional Cash Transfers11.   
economica/programacion-macroeconomica/otras-
publicaciones.  
11 Regarding to the Contributory Family Allowance 
(Asignacion Familiar Contributiva), EPH does not include 
a question to identify benefits but for wage earners the 
question of incomes includes that concept. Then, 
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Table 3. Incidence of Social Protection Incomes in Household Total Income by Economic 
Position of Household.   
In percentage. Argentina, 2003-2014. 
 
  
2003 2005 2007 2010 2012 2014 
Diff.  
2003-2014 
Formal Employers / Own-Account 8,5 7,0 8,8 9,8 10,9 10,6 2,2** 
Formal Employees 9,7 10,1 11,2 10,2 8,8 9,6 -0,1 
Informal Employers / Own-Account 12,1 14,3 11,7 15,5 16,1 17,7 5,6*** 
Informal Employees 11,6 13,6 14,3 15,8 15,8 17,5 5,9*** 
Household Employees 15,1 22,0 22,3 25,4 25,1 27,9 12,8*** 
Unemployed, Retired and Other 
Inactive 80,7 86,0 88,3 89,6 90,9 88,3 7,6*** 
Total 30,4 29,4 29,0 29,7 29,8 30,6 0,3 
Notes: (1) T-test for difference of proportions / (2) p-value<0.1* / p-value<0.05** / p-value<0.01***   
Source: Authors' own calculations based on Permanent Household Survey (EPH-INDEC).       
 
 
As Table 3 shows, the incidence of social 
protection incomes in Household’s Total 
Income (HTI) was stable between 2003 and 
2014. This reveals that even when SPE grew, 
other sources did the same, especially labour 
sources (this will be analysed in the next section). 
In terms of the welfare mix, from an aggregated 
perspective, it appears that labour and non-
labour incomes had a stable behaviour upon 
households’ budgets.  
Nevertheless, social heterogeneity should be 
considered at this point. Social protection 
incomes had a stable effect among households 
whose HME was formally employed, 
unemployed or retired. It also had a relative 
small effect upon households whose HME was 
a formal employer or self-employed in the 
formal sector. On the contrary, social protection 
incomes tended to be considerably more 
important during this decade among households 
whose HME were informal employers, self-
employed in the informal sector, informal 
employees (increased their share 5.6 and 5.9 p.p. 
between 2003 and 2014) or household 
employees (the share grew 12.8 p.p. between 
2003 and 2014). Incidence of social protection 
incomes upon budgets of these households 
                                                 
 
according to a methodology used by Rofman and Oliveri 
(2012), in this article we identified the people that had right 
to receive this allowance and, since the amount of the 
transfer differs according to wage level and the number of 
children, we assigned the amount of the allowance. 
extended especially since 2010 when the 
Asignacion Universal por Hijo –Universal Child 
Allowance– was introduced by the government.  
If we are interested in the outcomes of the 
welfare regime, incidence of different income 
sources in households’ budget does not allow 
statements in terms of standard of welfare and 
needs satisfaction. Poverty rate is here used as an 
absolute measure of economic welfare. To 
consider direct effects of social protection in 
terms of economic welfare at the household 
level, the observed and a counterfactual poverty 
rate should be compared. Whereas the former is 
calculated considering HTI, the latter excludes 
from HTI incomes from the social protection 
system12. 
Table 4 shows two different perspectives 
regarding the welfare regime. First, it shows 
increasing effects of social protection incomes in 
terms of poverty reduction during 2003-2014 
(4.6 p.p. in 2003 and 6.2 p.p. in 2014). The 
stronger effects in absolute terms have been 
located among households in which HME were 
informal employers or self-employed, informal 
employees, household employees or 
unemployed. It should be emphasized that this 
effect tended to be stronger among these group 
of households, whereas, among households 
12 Since in those households in which the HME is retired 
HTI relies mainly in social protection incomes, total 
incidence of counterfactual poverty is presented both 
considering and not considering this group of households.   
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whose HME had a formal employment tended 
to decrease during the 2003-2014 decade. In 
other words, our findings show that social 
protection incomes started to play a new role in 
household welfare during the last decade, an 
increased importance in needs satisfaction and 
the pursuit of livelihood, thus changing their 
incidence in the welfare regime. 
But, secondly, Table 4 shows the persistent and 
strong correlation between informal 
employment and poverty during the period 
2003-2014. In 2014, households whose HME 
was an informal employee or a household 
employee had almost 4 and 5 times more 
chances, respectively, of being in poverty that 
those households which HME was formally 
employed. In this vein, persistent poverty in 
Argentina may be understood as related to the 
persistence of informal employment –especially 
in terms of the informal sector and household 
employment– and the strong correlation 
between these labour positions and poverty. 
These can be characterised as the ‘systemic 
roots’ of poverty in Argentina (Ghosh, 2011; 
Saad-Filho, 2015).
 
Table 4. Observed and Counterfactual Poverty Rate(1) by Economic Position of Household.     
In percentage of households and percentage points. Argentina, 2003, 2007 and 2014. 




















Formal Employers / Own-
Account 8,8 11,3 -2,4 1,9 3,0 -1,1 5,7 7,6 -1,9 
Formal Employees 23,1 27,3 -4,2 10,4 15,2 -4,8 7,1 11,0 -3,9 
Informal Employers / Own-
Account 46,2 51,4 -5,2 24,0 28,5 -4,5 27,2 36,2 -9,0 
Informal Employees 50,8 56,1 -5,3 34,2 39,7 -5,5 26,0 37,9 -11,9 
Household Employees 49,2 55,7 -6,5 45,2 54,5 -9,3 36,3 47,6 -11,3 
Unemployed, Retired and Other 
Inactive 44,9 88,5 -43,6 21,3 81,9 -60,6 19,4 82,4 -63,1 
Total 36,5 52,0 -15,5 18,5 35,6 -17,1 15,5 34,9 -19,4 
Total - Excluding Retired 39,4 44,1 -4,6 20,1 25,1 -5,0 16,9 23,1 -6,2 
Notes: (1) Counter-factual poverty is poverty rate calculated without considering incomes from social protection system.  
Source: Authors' own calculations based on Permanent Household Survey (EPH-INDEC). 
 
 
5.3 Labour Markets, Social Protection and 
Households’ Behaviours Shaping the 
Welfare Regime 
As it was presented in the Methodology section, 
we apply equation (4) to micro-data to assess 
changes in household economic welfare between 
2003 and 2014. Particularly, we focus upon three 
income sources: labour market incomes, social 
protection system benefits (pensions, Children 
Allowances and conditional cash transfers, 
including employment programmes), and other 
incomes –with a very small share in households’ 
budgets–. For each of these income sources we 
                                                 
 
13 It should be stressed that according to EPH data HPCI 
recorded in 2014 was quite similar to that verified almost 
a decade before (in 1994), when structural reforms started 
consider changes in the average income per 
recipient, the number of recipients in the 
households’ and the proportional effect of 
changes in households’ size. Each of these 
effects can be shown as a percentage of total 
change in HPCI.  
On average, HPCI grew 50.1 per cent between 
2003 and 201413. In this context, according to 
data showed in Figure 1, it is possible to verify 
that economic growth between 2003 and 2014 
was essentially pro-poor. In fact, in the aftermath 
of the big economic crash of 2001-2002, HPCI 
grew more intensely among households whose 
to have their deepest effects. This performance shows the 
magnitude of 2001-2002 crisis in Argentina.  
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HME were unemployed, household employees, 
informal employers or employees; rather than in 
households in which the HME were formal 
employers or own-account. 
 
Figure 1. Average Changes in Household Per Capita Income by Economic Position of 
Household.  In variation rate. Argentina, 2003-2014. 
 
Source: Authors' own calculations based on Permanent Household Survey (EPH-INDEC). 
 
 
On average, HPCI grew 50.1 per cent between 
2003 and 2014. In this context, according to data 
showed in Figure 1, it is possible to verify that 
economic growth between 2003 and 2014 was 
essentially pro-poor. In fact, in the aftermath of 
the big crisis of 2001-2002, HPCI grew more 
intensely among households whose HME were 
unemployed, household employees, informal 
employers or employees; rather than in 
households in which the HME were formal 
employers or own-account.  
A range of questions arise from the analysis 
above. What are the factors that explain these 
different welfare outcomes? Which was the role 
of different parts of the welfare mix in such 
transformation of HCPI, and how do they shape 
the welfare regime? To answer these questions, 
Table 5 shows the results of the application of 
equation (4) to micro-data for 2003 and 2014. 
 
The main effect that explains changes in HPCI 
between 2003 and 2014 was growth in labour 
market income per recipient (76.8 per cent), but 
social protection benefits also played an 
important role (20.9 per cent). Average income 
per labour recipient was the most important 
effect in HPCI recovery (49 per cent), but 
households also increased the number of labour 
market income recipients (15.1 per cent). Social 
protection income –and therefore the state 
sphere in a welfare regime– played a smaller but 
relevant effect, and the increase of the number 
of recipients per household (9.6 per cent) was 
more important than the average income per 
recipient (7.3 per cent). Other non-labour 
income sources played an even smaller role in 
HPCI variation between 2003 and 2014. 
According to these data, households played an 
important role as an agent of economic welfare 
changes: they increased the number of recipients 
and slowly decreased their size, both of which 
factors have a positive effect in terms of HPCI 
(Table 5).  
Following our model of analysis, it is important 
to consider how these spheres were expressed 
among different socio-economic groups. In 
those groups with formally employed HME, 
HPCI change was best explained by the growth 
of labour market income per recipient (except 
among households in which the HME was a 
formal employer). Among households whose 
HME was a formal employee, the second most 
important effect was the increased number of 
labour market income recipients per household, 
to which the reduction of household size 
contributed. In this group, income from social 
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protection programs played a small effect in 
changing HPCI. 
A different pattern was recorded among 
households with HME that were informal 
employers or self-employed in the informal 
sector, informal employees or household 
employees. While too among these groups the 
most important factor explaining changes in 
HCPI was the growth of labour market income 
per recipient; income from social protection 
programs increased its participation in the 
performance of this variable. Specifically, the 
number of social protection income recipients 
per household played a central role, whereas the 
growth of income per recipient from this source 
had a minor effect. Among households with 
HME that were informal employees, it seems 
that the growth of the number of recipients was 
accompanied by a growth in household size, 
which had a negative effect on HPCI variation.
 
Table 5. Effects of Different Income Sources in Household Per Capita Income Change by 




r p e rp re pe rpe 
ΔLabour Incomes 76.8% 49.0% 15.1% 5.7% 4.7% 1.8% 0.5% 0.2% 
ΔSocial Protection Incomes 20.9% 7.3% 9.6% 1.2% 2.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 
ΔOther Non-Labour Incomes 2.3% 0.4% 1.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
Formal Employers / Own-Account                 
ΔLabour Incomes 78.0% -3.8% 16.6% 64.0% -0.1% -0.4% 1.6% 0.0% 
ΔSocial Protection Incomes 20.4% 1.2% 13.6% 3.7% 0.4% 0.1% 1.3% 0.0% 
ΔOther Non-Labour Incomes 1.6% -3.2% 3.9% 1.7% -0.7% -0.3% 0.4% -0.1% 
Formal Employees                 
ΔLabour Incomes 90.6% 60.4% 12.4% 10.7% 3.4% 2.9% 0.6% 0.2% 
ΔSocial Protection Incomes 8.3% 5.3% 1.4% 0.8% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 
ΔOther Non-Labour Incomes 1.1% 0.1% 0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Informal Employers / Own-Account                 
ΔLabour Incomes 74.9% 52.8% 8.9% 7.9% 2.6% 2.3% 0.4% 0.1% 
ΔSocial Protection Incomes 22.7% 1.2% 18.7% 0.9% 1.1% 0.1% 0.8% 0.0% 
ΔOther Non-Labour Incomes 2.4% -0.2% 2.2% 0.3% -0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
Informal Employees                 
ΔLabour Incomes 74.2% 62.2% 20.5% -10.3% 6.6% -3.3% -1.1% -0.4% 
ΔSocial Protection Incomes 23.6% 0.6% 24.7% -1.0% 0.7% 0.0% -1.3% 0.0% 
ΔOther Non-Labour Incomes 2.2% -0.4% 3.3% -0.3% -0.2% 0.0% -0.2% 0.0% 
Household Employees                 
ΔLabour Incomes 45.6% 44.4% 0.9% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
ΔSocial Protection Incomes 37.8% 3.1% 31.7% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
ΔOther Non-Labour Incomes 16.6% 6.9% 4.8% 0.0% 4.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Unemployed, Retired, Inactive                 
ΔLabour Incomes 9.9% 11.7% -3.2% 2.6% -2.1% 1.7% -0.5% -0.3% 
ΔSocial Protection Incomes 80.1% 32.2% 19.3% 12.3% 7.5% 4.8% 2.9% 1.1% 
ΔOther Non-Labour Incomes 9.9% 3.0% 2.9% 2.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.1% 
 Source: Authors' own calculations based on Permanent Household Survey (EPH-INDEC). 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In the context of the economic growth, 
reduction of unemployment and expansion of 
social protection systems as seen between the 
1990s and today, Latin America saw a strong 
decrease in poverty and inequality (ECLAC, 
2012; Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 2010; Cecchini et 
al., 2015). This trend was the opposite of what 
was observed in the Global North –especially in 
Europe–, at least after financial crisis exploded 
and “austerity” or fiscal discipline was imposed 
to reduce public expenditure. Argentina 
followed a trend similar to that of other Latin 
American countries, reducing unemployment 
and informal employment, whereas the social 
protection system expanded, especially in terms 
of its non-contributory aspects.  
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This article examined and critically assessed how 
these changes were articulated in household 
economic welfare, namely by considering 
changes in labour markets, state programs, and 
household behaviour as inter-related spheres of 
a single welfare regime –this analysis following 
Barrientos’ (2016) assertion that research on 
social protection should include its contribution 
to changing social structure. A central concern 
of this article was thus to explain persistent 
inequalities in terms of welfare outcomes among 
different groups of households or, in other 
words, the heterogeneity of the welfare regime, 
and not just to explain the reduction of social 
and economic inequalities. 
In this sense, the evidence showed a range of 
opposing trends in Argentina. While informal 
employment was reduced, four of every ten 
households were still headed by either a person 
employed in the informal economy or an 
unemployed person. Secondary employees in 
those households faced strong restrictions 
accessing to formal employment, thus reducing 
opportunities of decent work (ILO, 1999). This 
reveals a pattern of inequality that results of 
labour market features, with several impacts 
upon the welfare regime. Indeed, poverty 
remained high from a historical perspective and 
especially among households with HME in 
informal employment, even though income 
from labour grew strongly after the 2002 
currency devaluation and that growth was the 
main factor for household per capita income 
growth for all groups considered here. The state 
at this time also increased Social Policies 
Expenditure, which made income from those 
sources a greater factor in poverty reduction and 
had a particularly important role in the HPCI of 
households with HME in informal employment. 
Hence, the interplay between labour markets and 
social benefits changed and deepened. As our 
evidence showed, households were active agents 
of their own welfare: they overall increased both 
their number of people in the labour market and 
social benefit recipients.  
This article thus contributes to two different, 
current debates. Firstly, by binding labour 
markets and the social protection system 
together using the welfare regime framework, it 
was possible to describe social reproduction 
patterns of different social groups. Considering 
persistent structural heterogeneity as a feature 
that challenges labour markets and partly 
explains participation in the informal economy 
and low productivity activities (Infante, 2011), 
this paper showed the importance of social 
protection (especially, of social assistance) in the 
welfare regime after 2001 crisis. As Saad-Filho 
(2015) remarks for the Brazilian case, this 
pattern can also be seen as a “subsidy” of low-
productivity activities in a context of insufficient 
workforce demand. Secondly, and probably 
because of these “structural features” in 
Argentina’s labour markets, this paper highlights 
the limits of social protection systems in terms 
of poverty reduction. Evidence presented in this 
paper showed that poverty and informality 
remained correlated despite growth in both non-
contributory and contributory social have had an 
important role in welfare for the groups that 
remained in the informal economy. 
Overall our evidence demonstrated that public 
social expenditure had a “progressive” role in 
terms of the welfare regime during the last 
decade, in a double sense. It is acknowledged 
that social policy can “moderate” (that is to say, 
“compensate for”) inequalities, but also to shape 
the welfare regime. Beyond the limits of the 
social protection system in reducing poverty, it 
played a central role in household economic 
welfare among the poorest groups and those 
with HME in the informal economy. This means 
it tried to moderate social heterogeneity coming 
from markets and, even with its limits, it played 
an important role in “shaping” the welfare 
regime, opening new ways in which decent 
livelihood can be guaranteed. 
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